What are wicked problems?

The term ‘wicked problems’ was first coined in 1973 by Rittel and Webber, in their article “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”. In it, they define planning problems as wicked problems and name ten distinct properties of wicked problems. I will briefly apply each of these rules to the (arguably very broad) issue of climate change.

1. “There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem“

Human-induced climate change has happened largely due to the vast amount of carbon emissions over the last two and a half centuries. But the problem is much more complex, considering the population increase, improved quality of life, technological advancement, etc. that came with it. That’s why we often find ourselves asking where we should even focus our energy.

2. “Wicked problems have no stopping rule“

When is climate change solved? This question does not even begin to make sense, as the climate is changing, period. We are generally concerned with humanity’s responsibility for exacerbating climate change significantly since the industrial revolution. Some of these effects are irreversible – at least in the short-term. So, how do we define when we no longer need to “fix” climate change?

3. “Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad“

Different people and parties have very different priorities, and who are we to decide who is right or wrong? Hence, we need to try to be on the same page as much as possible and agree to take actions that are “good” rather than “bad” for solving the crisis we are facing.

4. “There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem“

Even if we stopped emitting carbon today, climate change wouldn’t just ‘stop’ or revert to its natural speed. Things take time to get back on course. For example, it took around 20 years after the ban of CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) for the ozone layer to show signs of recovery.

5. “Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because there is no
opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly“

(Parts of) Solutions to deal with climate change are generally significant changes to how we do things on this planet. A shift to renewable energies, for example, is a one-shot operation in a way, because it requires us to entirely change how we go about the generation (and now storage) of energy.

6. “Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of
potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may
be incorporated into the plan“

New approaches and technologies aimed at fighting the climate crisis are developed all the time, but if a problem cannot be properly defined, it is logical that there is not a finite list of definable (potential) solutions either.

7. “Every wicked problem is essentially unique“

Unique does not mean that they are not related in some way, as many of the issues driving, relating to, or being caused by climate change are.

8. “Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem“

I think this one explains itself. Sometimes it is difficult to define what is and isn’t a part of climate change. When we are talking about land-use change, biodiversity loss, global warming, ocean acidification, extreme weather patterns, and more, it can be incredibly confusing. Yet, they are all connected, and some of them are caused by the other.

9. “The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in
numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s
resolution“

Depending on how we frame a problem, a different solution may be considered (first).

10. “The planner has no right to be wrong“

This essentially comes back to each solution being a “one-shot” operation. As humanity, we cannot afford to be wrong- not about the problem(s) and not about the solution(s).

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References
Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4531523